The convergence of IT and OT has unlocked unprecedented efficiency and productivity gains across various industries. However, this also makes OT networks increasingly vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. One significant attack vector that is often overlooked is the USB drive.
Traditionally, OT systems are air-gapped and have strict physical and logical access controls in place. Still, the need for file transfers into and among control systems remains “low-hanging fruit” for attackers, who have turned to removable media like USBs as entry points. The convenience of USB devices poses a significant risk. Whether for data transfer, software updates, or system configuration, the use of USB drives has opened a potential gateway for malicious actors to infiltrate critical infrastructure, as they can be easily infected with malware designed to steal data, disrupt operations, or even deploy ransomware.
OT environments are often targeted due to their critical functions, and many incidents targeting this sector involve USB technology. The consequences of a successful USB-borne attack on OT infrastructure can be severe, ranging from production downtime and financial losses to potential safety hazards and environmental damage.
The types of USB attacks can be sorted into four categories:
These attacks include reprogramming the USB drive’s internal microcontroller and making it look like a particular USB device, even though it carries out the operations of another.
These attacks include reprogramming the USB device's firmware to execute malicious actions.
These attacks include leveraging flaws in how operating systems normally interact with USB protocols/standards.
USB Killer is a malicious device designed to physically damage devices by delivering a high-voltage surge through their USB ports which causes a short circuit, which in turn overkills the entire thing.
The consequences of a successful USB attack on OT systems can be devastating.
A prime example of a USB-based attack is the infamous Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet used a combination of social engineering and a specially crafted USB to infiltrate Iranian nuclear facilities, causing extensive damage. The attack was launched when an infected USB drive was plugged into the plant's control system. This was the first known malware attack that resulted in the physical destruction of equipment and was performed by a USB drive, serving as a warning that OT systems may be targeted at any time.
In another concerning instance, the Copperfield campaign targeted critical infrastructure facilities in the Middle East. This attack utilized USB drives infected with a variant of the H-Worm RAT, giving the attackers access to steal data, disrupt operations, or deploy further malware. This incident highlights the need for rigorous security measures in OT environments, as even familiar devices like USB drives can be a dangerous entry point for sophisticated attacks.
Given the critical nature of OT environments, organizations must adopt a multi-layered security approach to mitigate the risk of USB attacks. Here are some key measures organizations can take: